The Aftenposten 13: New Wikileaks Cables Show Extent of US Opposition to Aristide.

Adapted from the Mediahacker.org blog   (By Ansel Herz) Not long after former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide landed in Haiti on Mar. 18, Kristoffer Rønneberg at the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten posted online 13 new private diplomatic cables from the US government relating to Aristide and Haiti from the Wikileaks Cablegate set. Taken together, they portray the United States as intractably, almost obsessively, occupied with marginalizing Aristide and the Lavalas, and making sure other nations fall into line. The French government conspired with the US to thwart Aristide's return, discussing how to "hinder" the return fl ight's logistics. The cables also show that in 2008 current President René Préval was trying to "co-opt" the Fanmi Lavalas party into his ruling coalition and was flatly opposed to Aristide even being "in the hemisphere." Below is a round-up of key passages from the cables. Four days before Aristide was fl own out of the country in 2004, the Dominican Ambassador to Haiti said he was "worried" about chaos in the North but thought that Aristide was "very clever." Aristide did not ask the Dominicans for any help or the use of a helicopter. In October 2004, a confidante of the Bahamian Prime Minister said the U.S. did not but should have given "a call from senior USG offi - cials, or the White House, advising him 'when the United States decided to change direction on Aristide' and 'remove him from power.'" In November 2004, nine months after the coup, Dominican President Lionel Fernandez gave a speech in front of other regional leaders in which he said Aristide commanded "great popular support" within Haiti and called for his inclusion in the country's democratic future. The U.S. government was shocked and outraged, commenting: "The Aristide comment appeared to come out of nowhere. Fernandez had not previously discussed Aristide by name in conversations with us, or with our French and Canadian counterparts… Perhaps the greatest surprise for us was the palace's presumption that there would be no downside." The cable continues: "On Nov. 6, 2004, during a pull-aside at a social event, the Ambassador admonished Fernandez that his reference to Aristide was a serious mistake, one that had the potential of further inflaming a situation already dangerous for the Haitian people and for the international peacekeeping force. Fernandez replied that given popular support for Lavalas, it would have to be part of the situation. The Ambassador was direct: Aristide had led a violent gang involved in narcotics trafficking and had squandered any credibility he formerly may have had. 'Nobody has given me any information about that,' Fernandez replied. The Ambassador insisted that no supporter of human rights and democracy could in good conscience allow Aristide and his close supporters back into the situation in Haiti. Fernandez listened and eventually agreed to distinguish between Aristide and Lavalas. He asked for any information on Aristide that the United States might be able to share with him." Two months later, in January 2005, President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela told the US Ambassador there that "he believes the USG is wrong on Haiti: There is no long term solution that does not involve Aristide in some way." (The Venezuelan ambassador was the only foreign diplomat in the delegation that received Aristide at the airport on Mar. 18.) That same month, France and the United States discussed how to keep Aristide from returning home, planning to warn Caribbean countries and tell South Africa he must not be allowed to return "under the pretext" that it would hurt their chance for a UN Security Council seat: "Bienvenu later offered to express our shared concerns in Pretoria, perhaps under the pretext that as a country desiring to secure a seat on the UN Security Council, South Africa could not afford to be involved in any way with the destabilization of another country... Bienvenu speculated on exactly how Aristide might return, seeing a possible opportunity to hinder him in the logistics of reaching Haiti. If Aristide traveled commercially, Bienvenu reasoned, he would likely need to transit certain countries in order to reach Haiti. Bienvenu suggested a demarche to CARICOM countries by the U.S. and EU to warn them against facilitating any travel or other plans Aristide might have. . .Both Bienvenu and Barbier confi ded that South African mercenaries could be heading towards Haiti, with Bienvenu revealing the GOF had documented evidence that 10 South African citizens had come to Paris and requested Dominican visas between February and the present." In July 2005, a South African official told the French that its government "would not support any effort by Aristide to return… Ntshinga told the French that he would share the French concern about Aristide´s activities with the National Intelligence Agency and ensure that President Mbeki was also informed." A month later, the Jamaican Labor Minister was chastised for describing Aristide "as a friend in need" after the coup. He said Washington was overreacting. Jamaica allowed him to pass through the country on his way into exile, and had offered the Aristides the option to stay there for a few weeks "for family reasons," but on the condition that Aristide "keep a low profile" and refrain from making public statements. He stressed Jamaica wasn't taking an adversarial position to the United States, but was "reminded [by the Ambassador] that the [Jamaican government] acted unhelpfully" during the coup and its aftermath. In the fall of 2008, as rumors swirled that Aristide might leave South Africa for Venezuela, Préval met with the US Ambassador: "President René Préval made reference to these rumors, telling the Ambassador that he did not want Aristide 'anywhere in the hemisphere.' Subsequent to that, he remarked that he is concerned that Aristide will accept the Chavez offer but deflected any discussion of whether Preval himself was prepared to raise the matter with Chavez." The cables also contain indepth commentary on Fanmi Lavalas, Aristide's party, with various members (including Yves Cristallin, a presidential candidate in the Nov. 28 fi rst round who purported to represent Lavalas) informing the Embassy on what's happening behind the scenes. Meanwhile Préval, the cable says, was trying to co-opt the party into his political coalition. I quote at length for close observers of Haitian politics: "Despite his disagreements with Aristide, Cristallin said he feels compelled to keep his opposition to Aristide´s return private due to the considerable support for the former President among many segments of the population. [Text Removed by Aftenposten] echoed these sentiments in his October 1 meeting with Poloff, noting that he shared Cristallin´s belief that the Executive Committee appointed by Aristide was illegitimate Like Cristallin, he made an impassioned plea for U.S. assistance so that factions of the party willing to renounce violent demonstrations and forego illicit financing would prevail against other factions of the party. "Embassy sources tell us that President Préval is also actively working to co-opt popular groups affiliated with Lavalas to shore up his Support.. [Text Removed by Aftenposten] told Poloff on September 19 that Préval met 'at least weekly' with the leaders of the "Reflection Cell," including Jean-Marie Samdy, at the National Palace and that Préval had promised the group HTG 58 million (approximately USD 1.5 million) in funds from the PetroCaribe account to distribute to parents in poor neighborhoods for the beginning of the school year in early October. [Text Removed by Aftenposten] provided a more plausible account of the agreement, saying that the Education Ministry had agreed to task Lavalas-affiliated 'popular organizations' to identify needy families in poor neighborhoods, and that the Ministry would then pay their school fees directly to the school concerned. "Although Aristide is nominally the 'National Representative' of Fanmi Lavalas, the party has essentially been leaderless since Aristide left Haiti in 2004, and any attempt to reassert control over Lavalas would be fiercely opposed (albeit privately) by one or another group within the party. From South Africa, Aristide has been either unable or unwilling to resolve disputes within his party or mobilize popular support for Lavalas. "Factions in the party have their reasons for opposing or supporting a greater political role for Aristide in Haiti and in the party. On one side of the divide are elected offi cials and former government offi cials who want to unify feuding groups into a disciplined party organization and have the leadership elected by and accountable to the party in Haiti rather than to Aristide. These individuals resent Aristide´s interventions in party matters from afar, and are critical of Aristide´s conduct during his two terms in office. On the other side lie leaders linked to popular organizations who hope that Aristide´s greater proximity will help them revive grassroots militancy, which would then propel them to positions of prominence." The cables also reveal that the Vatican agreed with the US Embassy that Aristide shouldn't return after the earthquake and said it would communicate that to him. The Dominican government was concerned about the mass migration of Haitians to the Dominican Republic, and the Bahamas was not optimistic about a peaceful resolution of the 2004 crisis without outside intervention in the days leading up to Aristide's ouster, the cables show. ____________________ "La vraie reconstruction d'Haïti passe par des réformes en profondeur des structures de l'État pour restaurer la confiance, encourager les investisseurs et mettre le peuple au travail. Il faut finir avec cette approche d'un État paternaliste qui tout en refusant de créer le cadre approprié pour le développement des entreprises mendie des millions sur la scène internationale en exhibant la misère du peuple." Cyrus Sibert Reconstruction d'Haïti : A quand les Réformes structurelles? Haïti : La continuité du système colonial d'exploitation  prend la forme de monopole au 21e Siècle. WITHOUT REFORM, NO RETURN ON INVESTMENT IN HAITI (U.S. Senate report.)